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Postwar Emergency Measures
T
HE end of World War II brought no change in the direction of
federal policy, which was toward greater participation in, and
control over, the mortgage credit facilities and activities of the
country. In addition, in the related fields of construction, operation
of rental housing, and sale of new dwellings, certain extraordinary
controls of the war period were adapted to temporary postwar
situations. Somewhat less drastic measures in the field of credit
were adopted as accessories to the emergency programs.
In September 1945, immediately after the collapse of Japan, the
Administration, fearing heavy unemployment, released controls
on industrial and commercial construction. Residential construc-
tion was purposely held back because of the presumed greater job-
giving advantages of other types of building. However, the gen-
erally rapid reconversion of American industry to peacetime
production, the maintenance of personal incomes, and the rise in
the nation's marriage rate made it evident within a few months
that the housing situation and not unemployment was to be the
nation's critical domestic problem. It is not pertinent here to go
into details of the planning and counterplanning that ensued. It
is enough to note that, by the spring of 1946, all building and real
estate activities were more completely under surveillance and con-
trol than during the war. And, as a consequence, real estate finance
was equally influenced by governmental action.
The pattern of postwar emergency intervention by the federal
government consisted of an elaboration of devices developed before
and during the war: the creation of credit facilities for special
groups of borrowers; the direction of credit into certain lines,
through insurance and guarantees; the restriction of mortgage
credit outlets through control over new construction; the use of
federal and state funds where other means seemed inadequate to
achieve the ends of public policy; the maintenance of priorities for
the benefit of specific parts of the population; and the maintenance
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of controls over the rental and management of rental housing.
From 1944 to 1947, the attention of the federal government (so far
as it was concerned with emergency measures in construction and
real estate finance) was focused on four pieces of legislation: (1) the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act (theso-called"G.I.Billof
Rights"),' (2) the Veterans' Emergency Housing Act (the Patman
Act),2 (3) the Price Control Extension Act of and (4) the
Housing and Rent Act of
At the same time, the strands of a longer-term housing and
credit policy were being more deliberately woven. The present
chapter is concerned only with the emergency measures and their
impacts, while the succeeding chapter discusses the synthesis of
these with longer-term action.
SERVICEMEN'S READJUSTMENT ACT
Of the immediate postwar measures, the first and probably the
most significant for the future was the enactment of the Service-
men's Readjustment Act of 1944, Title V of which provided for a
system of government guarantees making possible 100 percent
financing for farms, homes, and business ventures.
Under this plan, as first adopted in June 1944, the Adminis-
trator of Veterans' Affairs was authorized (for a period of ten years
after the end of the war) to guarantee as much as 50 percent of a
loan, up to a $2,000 maximum amount, made to a veteran of World
War II. No equity investment was required. In fact, the avowed
purpose of the Act was to make such investment unnecessary. State
legislation was quickly passed to permit state-chartered institutions
to participate in the operation. Thus, 100 percent loans became
possible on properties valued as high as $6,000, where the lender
made a conventional loan of two-thirds of value and added the
maximum guaranteed amount. On dwellings financed with Fed-
eral Housing Administration insured first mortgages, the Act also
authorized the guarantee of second mortgages up to 20 percent of
the value or a maximum of $2,000. The amortization period in
both cases was set at twenty-five years, except for farm property,
1 59 Stat. 626 (1944); 38 U.S.C. 693 et seq.
260 Stat. 207 (1946); 50 App. U.S.C. 1821-33.
$ 60 Stat. 664 (1946); 50 U.S.C. 901 et seq.
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where forty years was permissible. Interest on guaranteed loans was
set by the statute at 4 percent.
Amid the subsequent inflation of realty prices, it was soon evi-
dent that the $2,000 maximum guarantee would be ineffectual if
the objectives of the Act were to be realized. In amendments passed
in December 1945, the maximum guaranteed amount for home
loans was accordingly raised to $4,000, now making 100 percent
financing possible for a property valued at $12,000. or less, where
a conventional loan for two-thirds of value was combined with the
guaranteed amount, and $20,000 where the plan for combination
FHA-VA loans was utilized. The same amendments limited the
eligible lenders to institutions regularly examined by state or
federal agencies.
Some novel features of this Act deserve mention. Although a
loan was automatically guaranteed when granted, it was required
that the appraisal, and consequently the determination of the max-
imum amount of the loan, be made by an appraiser approved by
the Veterans' Administration. In contrast to the FHA method of
reimbursing an insured lender with long-term debentures in case
of default and foreclosure, the veterans' loan plan provided for a
cash payment on default of an amount not in excess of the guaran-
teed amount of the original loan, reduced or increased as that
amount might be in proportion as the total loan outstanding had
been reduced or increased; or, at his option, the Administrator of
Veterans' Affairs might take an assignment of the mortgage and pay
the obligation in full.
The scheme thus provided full debt financing for the acquisi-
tion or refinancing of real property with what was in effect a
'guarantee by government of the lender's risk. It resulted in a finan-
cial procedure in which the function of the lender was reduced
almost to that of a disbursing and collecting agency of the govern-
ment.
The plan had other unique aspects in its relation to the bor-
rower. Plainly, it carried forward the idea of special facilities for
beneficiaries already established in the provisions for farm
security and urban public housing. But more than this, it intro-
duced a new kind of protective, governmental scrutiny and control
of the financial transaction: the veteran was barred from acquiring
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excessof the value of the property as fixed by the approved ap-
praiser, irrespective, of his willingness or ability to pay the excess
amount.
VETERANS' EMERGENCY HOUSING PROGRAM
Early in February 1946, the President, having already partially
restored wartime construction controls and vested his. wartime
powers to regulate construction in the newly created Office of the
Housing Expediter, recommended an elaborate and radical legis-
lative program aimed to increase further the authority of the
Expediter in dealing with the housing shortage.
The first phase of this program involved appropriations for
federally-financed temporary dwelling units to be operated by edu-
cational institutions, localities, or the Federal Public Housing
Authority for housing the families of veterans. Nearly 266,000 units
were provided during 1946 and 1947 under this program.5
Late in May 1946, Congress passed the Veterans' Emergency
Housing Act of 1946.6 This Act, which in many ways was more far
reaching in its control over the housing supply than any previous
legislation, contained the following principal features:
(1) It confirmed and extended until the end of 1947 the wartime
powers of the President to issue priorities, to prohibit proposed
construction, and to make allocations of building materials, all
of which already had been delegated to the Expediter. Large
powers of direction over the actions of other governmental agen-
cies (FHA, the Office of Price Administration, Civilian Produc-
tion Administration), in so far as they affected the veterans'
housing situation, were also granted to the Expediter.7
(2) It authorized the fixing of prices on all newly constructed houses
(but not, as had been requested, on houses completed before the
date of enactment, except as such prices might have been estab-
lished in priority agreements).
(3) It provided preferences for veterans of World War II in either
rental or purchase of newly completed housing accommodations.
SSenateReport No. 892, 81st Congress, 1st sess.,p.28. As of March 31, 1949, a
reported 123,000 units had been transferred to educational institutions and 196,600
Units were owned by the federal government.
660Stat. 207 (1946); 50 U.S.C. 1821 et seq.
7ThePresident made the controls granted by the Act more effective by combining
the functions of the National Housing Agency with those of the Office of the Housing
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(4) It renewed until June 194.7 the war housin.g insurance provisions
of the Federal Housing Administration (Title VI of the Na-
tional Housing Act), limiting their use to builders of housing
for veterans (in place of workers in war industries), setting the
interest rate at 4 percent on mortgages so insured, and raising the
maximum amount of an insurable mortgage to meet current
increases in cost.8
(5) It authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to grant
subsidies to manufacturers, up to a maximum amount of $400
million, in the form of premium payments for increases in the
production of building materials.
(6) It authorized (again through the RFC) the making of produc-
tion loans and the guaranteeing of markets for a maximum of
200,000 prefabricated dwellings and for what the Act called "new
type" materials.
The effect of this Act, combined with the retained control of
rents and operation of the veterans' loan program, was virtually to
create a controlled realty market, in so far as additions to the supply
were concerned. Since no structure could be built without a gov-
ernment permit, mortgage funds, except for the refinancing of
existing property, could flow only to the extent and in the direc-
tions that government, within the limitations of the law, might
determine.
After a twenty-five-day lapse in controls, the Price Extension
Act of 1946re-established federal controls over rents and prices.
A fear of mass evictions and rapidly rising rents led to the re-enact-
ment of rent controls with only very minor changes from the war-
time legislation.
FAILURE OF THE EMERGENCY PROGRAM
On assuming his authority, the Housing Expediter forecast the
initiation of 950,000 new permanent dwellings during 1946, most
of which were to be available to veterans at prices not over $6,000,
or at rentals not exceeding $50 a month. Bythe fall of the year it
was evident not only that this total would notbe reached but also
that the number of houses completed would fall far short of what
8TheFHA Commissioner was authorized to permit maximum mortgages of
$8,100 on houses for sale and $1,800 per room for rental properties, where necessary
to meet increased costs.
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might be estimated on the basis of units actually started.1° More-
over, it was clear that the prices of finished houses would much
exceed the Expediter's calculations. The subsidy program had
failed both to ease the price situation or measurably to affect the
volume of materials production.1' The guaranteed market program
for prefabricated houses got under way too late to have any influ-
ence at all on the year's supply of new houses.12 Faced with this
situation, the Expediter called for more liberal use of government
credit and more drastic controls both of prices and construction
and resigned when his demands were not met. The machinery of
control was then subjected to a process of gradual dismantlement.
Many reasons may be given for this failure, but nearly all are
ultimately traceable to the shortage of materials and the increased
cost of building.13 Serious strikes in the coal, steel, and shipping
industries, which occurred in the first part of 1946, contributed to
the materials shortage and the rising level of costs. More pertinent,
however, were certain features of the program itself. The combina-
tion of an unrestricted wage policy and a rigid price policy caused
serious distortions in profit margins among various optional items
of manufacture and.rètarded the increase in materials production.
At the same time, the housing program, through priorities and
allocations of materials and insured loans to builders, greatly aug-
mented the number of houses started; and the provision for 100
percent mortgage loans to veterans added greatly to the number
of buyers and assured sales for all housing that might be produced.
Inevitably, the extraordinary pressure on the materials supply
10 The figures for the year were approximately 670,500 permanent dwelling units
started and 437,000 completed (Construction, Bureau of Labor Statistics, February
1948, Table 4, p. 5).
11 By the end of the year only about $13 million of subsidy payments had been
disbursed from a total of around $50 million in commitments. Total payments were
in excess of $30 million, according to information obtained from the Office of the
Housing Expediter.
12 During 1946, shipments of prefabricated dwellings amounted to about 37,200
units, of which few if any benefited from guaranteed market contracts. Up to June
1947, when the guaranteed market program had neared its end, it comprised less
than 90,000 Units for completion during 1947 and 1948 (Office of the Housing Expe.
diter, Monthly Bulletin, June 1947).
13 Wholesale prices of building materials increased 37 percent between VJ Day
and the end of 1946; in the same period hourly earnings in building construction
increased 14 percent. These figures, however, do not adequately represent the increase
in total building costs which, because of the added effects of delays and low produc.
tivity, probably rose from 40 to 60 percent above end-of.the-war levels. The upward
movement continued during 1941 and 1948.112
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brought about first a lengthening of the time of completion and
then a sharp decline in the number of starts.
It soon became evident that in an effort of this kind sector
of the economy could not be subjected to regulation and direction
by the government while the remainder became increasingly free
of official restraint. In his attempt to make the housing controls
effective, the Expediter was more and more forced to consider
sanctions that affected other industries: automobiles, furniture
and household appliances, industrial and commercial building,
public works, and the export trade. In the end there were only two
choices: resort to a much more fully planned and regulated econ-
omy, or abandonment of the housing program. With the removal
of commodity price controls in November, and with the resignation
of the Expediter and revision of regulations in December 1946, it
was evident which alternative had been taken.
RETREAT FROM CONTROL
The official veterans' housing program, as revised for 1947, re-
placed the priorities system by a federal permit system and ceiling
prices for new homes by a limitation on floor area. Premium pay-
ment agreements for building materials were not extended, and all
but two of the existing agreements were withdrawn. The market
guarantee program for prefabricated houses and new materials was
continued on a diminishing scale. Allocation of raw materials was
discontinued after the first quarter of 1947, and, while limitations
on nonresidential building construction were maintained, they
were on a slightly more generous basis.
In mid-1947 the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 14repealedall
but a few of the emergency powers conferred upon the Housing
Expediter. The only remaining provisions of the Veterans' Emer-
gency Housing Act related to continued veterans' preference for
occupancy of new housing units and extension of Title VI of the
National Housing Act. Control over nonresidential construction
was limited to the relatively unimportant category of buildings for
amusement and recreation purposes.
The Housing and Rent Act of 1947 took a step toward de-
control of rents by exempting new construction along with other
minor categories of rental accommodations, permitting increases
1461Stat. 193 (1947); 50 U.S.C. 1881 et seq.EMERGENCY MEASURES 113
up to 15 percent for existing units upon voluntary agreement by
landlord and tenant on a lease of not less than an eighteen-month
term from the passage of the Act, and providing for decontrol as of
February 29, 1948.
In spite of the general tendency of this legislation to remove
war and early postwar restraints on construction, the idea of finan-
cial facilities for special groups was persistent. In the summer of
1947 the special class of mortgage insurance for veterans' housing
under Title VI of the National Housing Act was extended, and a
provision was added for Fl-IA insurance of commercial loans to
manufacturers of prefabricated houses.
Although the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 anticipated rent
decontrol at the end of February 1948, the control powers of the
Housing Expediter were extended for another fifteen months from
March 30, Apartment hotels and single family houses rented
for the first time were exempt from control, and other minor mod-
ifications of t.he control regulations were made.
In early 1948 another step in the gradual retreat from emer-
gency programs was taken when the FHA Title VI insurance pro-
gram for one- to four-family homes was permitted to lapse. The
Title VI rental housing program, however, was extended with only
slight modifications.
COMPLETE REMOVAL OF FEDERAL CONTROLS
PROVES DIFFICULT
Termination of the last surviving emergency control programs was
again deferred in early 1949 when the Housing and Rent Act of
1949extendedboth the veterans' preferences for occupancy of
new accommodations and the federal program of rent controls
until mid-1950.
At the time of passage of this legislation, however, the convic-
tion was growing that by mid-1950 the federal government should
be able to divest itself of responsibility for rent controls, placing
control of individual areas under local authority and action. In
anticipation of that time, three methods were provided by the
1949 legislation for elimination of federal controls in individual
localities:
1562Stat. 93 (1948); 50 U.S.C. 1881 et seq.
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(1) Decontrol by the Housing Expediter, either on his own initiative
or in response to a recommendation of the local advisory board.
In these instances, future recontrol was permissible at the Expe-
diter's discretion.
(2) Decontrol by resolution of the local governing body, with ap-
proval of the governor of the state, declaring rent control no
longer necessary. No recontrol power was provided in these cases.
(3) Decontrol of the entire state or specific localities by passage of a
state law declaring rent control no longer necessary. Possibilities
of recontrol in these cases depended on the provisions of the
decontrol law.
In addition, federal control could be replaced by state or local
control established by state law and properly certified by the gov-
ernor of the state.
By early October 1949, a total pf 189 entire defense rental areas
had been freed from control, out of nearly 600 such areas in March
1949. Parts of an additional 144 defense rental areas had been
decontrolled; and control of rents in fourteen areas in Wisconsin
had been transferred by state law to control by the state of
'SNisconsin.'7
In addition to the Wisconsin law, which provided for the re-
moval of rent control on June 1, 1950, four other states made
steps in the same direction. Nebraska and Texas had acted to
terminate controls in the fall of 1949, with authority for local con-
trols in Texas at the option of the localities. Legislative action in
Alabama and Nevada, the former providing decontrol in May 1950,
was incomplete. The Alabama legislation was involved in a court
test of the legality of the governor's approval; the Nevada law
awaited the governor's action.
In October 1949 the federal government was still arranging
for disposition of federally-owned housing produced during the
war and postwar emergencies. The initial disposition date for this
housing had been extended from July 1949 to January 1, 1951.
The unsolved disposition problems involved 136,300 war housing
units in permanent structures, 188,250 war housing units in tem-
porary structures (including trailers), and about 125,250 veterans'
emergency units in temporary structures.18 Proposals for disposi-
17Summarizedfrom notices by the Housing Expediter in the Federal Register and
other sources.
18PublicHousing Administration statistics for June 30, 1949.EMERGENCY MEASURES 115
tion included sale of the permanent units for public low-rent use
or private investment and transfer of the responsibility for dispos-
ing of temporary units to local governments or educational institu-
tions. However, with the exception of an authorization for the
Public Housing Authority to give veterans' emergency units on
municipally-owned land to the cities in which they were located,
all decisions on the disposition of war housing were deferred in the
first session of the Eighty.first Congress, by setting the date for
disposition ahead from January 1, 1950 to January 1, 1951.
With the gradual dismemberment of the federal rent control
system and the plans for an end to federal ownership of the war
and veterans' housing, the series of emergency postwar measures
in the field of housing and housing finance drew to a close. The in-
corporation of some features of the emergency programs into longer-
term federal policies and practices, especially in the field of finance.
is discussed in the succeeding chapter.
EMERGENCY HOUSING PROGRAMS OF STATES
The same pressures for emergency action that were brought on the
first postwar Congress were felt by the state legislatures, forty-seven
of which were in session during the first half of 1947. The govern-
ments of the various states developed legislation adapted to the
specific emergency housing problems of their own populations. For
the most part, state emergency activities related to providing assist-
ance to veterans, to relieving special local problems of nonveterans,
and to supplementing federal rent control.
The federal emergency program for providing temporary units
for the use of veterans' families extended into every state and the
District of Columbia. In addition, twenty-eight states adopted vet-
erans' programs supplementing federal activities.'9 There was great
variety in these state programs, ranging from the establishment of
a state coordinating committee in Maryland to assist cities in par-
ticipating in the federal veterans' emergency housing program to
a comprehensive program in California involving construction of
19 Discussion of emergency housing action by states is based on material prepared
by the Office of the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency for the
Hearings on General Housing Legislation Before a Subcommittee on Banking and
Currency (U. S. Congress. Senate. 81st Congress, 1st sess., February 3.21, 1949). See
also "State and Local Housing Programs After World War II." Monthly Labor
Review, Vol. 69, No. 5 (November 1949) pp. 499.502.116 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
units for rent to veterans, with state and local subsidies, loans from
the state to veterans for purchase of both homes and farms, and
purchase of federal surplus housing units for resale to veterans.
Other devices enacted that year for assistance to veterans in-
cluded (1) construction by municipalities of permanent units for
rent to veterans in Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
and Virginia and construction of units for sale in Milwaukee; (2)
provision of land for use of veterans—for building temporary units
in Lincoln, Nebraska and in Connecticut, or for building homes
to be owned by veterans in Massachusetts; (3) an extra homestead
tax exemption in Louisiana; (4) special lumber production for
veterans from public lands in Connecticut and New Hampshire;'
(5)dormitoriesat colleges in several states; and (6) preferences for
occupancy in publicly-owned, state-assisted housing in New York
and Rhode Island.
Nearly all of these activities have a specified time limit, such
as a five-year period for the homestead tax exemption in Louisiana,
and a common proviso that temporary units provided for veterans'
occupancy shall be vacated and demolished by a specified date or at
such earlier time as the housing emergency is declared at an end.
On the other hand some of the benefits for veterans are of indefi-
nite duration, as, for example, the funds provided in California and
Mississippi for purchase of farms or homes to be resold to veterans
at cost and the specific authorization for groups of veterans in
North Carolina to establish housing cooperatives.
In addition to the emergency programs for aid to veterans, a
few states adopted plans for emergency aid to nonveteran groups
with special problems. California provided state funds for financing
housing for agricultural laborers. Rhode Island authorized Provi-
dence and other cities to acquire or build permanent housing for
veterans and nonveterans. Arkansas authorized cities to acquire
federal surplus property to be operated as emergency housing for a
two-year period, without restriction of use to families of veterans.
A number of states adopted emergency legislation between
1945 and 1949 supplementing federal rent controls.2° Most corn-
20Discussionbased generally on Carrie E. Hunter, State Rent Control Laws,
Public Affairs Bulletin No. 62 (February 1948), Legislative Reference Service of the
Library of Congress, supplemented by additional information on legislation adopted
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monwere laws to enable the state or local governments to act
effectively if local emergency conditions developed when federal
residential rent controls ended. Some states, however, established
state controls of rents for rooming houses, tourist homes, hotel
accommodations, or trailers when federal controls over these facili-
ties were removed by legislative or administrative action in 1947
and 1948. And New York in 1945 established controls over rents of
commercial and business space when Congress refused to inaugu-
rate federal controls.
Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, and Rhode Island enacted
residential rent control legislation in July 1946, when federal con-
trols lapsed between June 30 and July 25. New York had previously
adopted stand-by controls to take effect when federal controls ex-
pired.21 During 1947, additional state control programs were en-
acted in Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Texas adopted a rent decontrol law in
1949 which also authorized local rent controls at th.e option of the
local governments involved.
The state of New York established the first rent control pro-
grams for nonresidential properties in early 1945. Rents of indus-
trial,. storage, and wholesale business properties were controlled
under a Commercial Space Act adopted on January 24, 1945, while
a law, approved on March 28, 1945, brought the rents
of retail store and office space under control.
All state programs for rent control included restraints on evic-
tions as essential parts of the control procedure. From these state
laws for controlling residential rents emerged two significant varia-
tions from the federal program. First was a proviso in some of the
stand-by legislation as early as 1947 that localities would be able to
declare an end to the state control on their own initiative. Second
was the frequent assignment of responsibility for enforcement or
adjustment of rent ceilings to the courts, rather than to elaborate
administrative organizations.
The New York programs for control of nonresidential rents in-
volved two additional distinctive features which deserve study
21Thefirst state rent legislation was enacted after World 'War I in Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin. In World War H, Virginia was the first state
to enact rent control legislation in 1942, but this legislation expired March 15, 1944,
without having been placed in effect.118 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
should the question of rent control arise in the future. One feature
provided for rent increases above the legislative maximum if the
increase were arrived at by arbitration, written agreement of the
parties involved, or a Supreme Court decision. The second feature
was that the law made excessive rent charges unenforceable, rather
than prohibiting the excessive rentals. While somewhat greater
court activity may have resulted from these features, a substantial
reduction of administrative expense and possibly greater equity of
administration may have been gained.